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Abstract—This paper proposes a peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading
scheme that can help the centralized power system to reduce the total
electricity demand of its customers at the peak hour. To do so, a
cooperative Stackelberg game is formulated, in which the centralized
power system acts as the leader that needs to decide on a price at the
peak demand period to incentivize prosumers to not seeking any energy
from it. The prosumers, on the other hand, act as followers and respond
to the leader’s decision by forming suitable coalitions with neighboring
prosumers in order to participate in P2P energy trading to meet their
energy demand. The properties of the proposed Stackelberg game are
studied. It is shown that the game has a unique and stable Stackelberg
equilibrium, as a result of the stability of prosumers’ coalitions. At
the equilibrium, the leader chooses its strategy using a derived closed-
form expression, while the prosumers choose their equilibrium coalition
structure. An algorithm is proposed that enables the centralized power
system and the prosumers to reach the equilibrium solution. Numerical
case studies demonstrate the beneficial properties of the proposed scheme.
Index Terms—Peer-to-peer, energy trading, game theory, prosumer,
auction, coalition formation.
NOMENCLATURE
N Total number of participating prosumers.
T Total number of time slots.
S Set of seller prosumers.
B Set of buyer prosumers.
Ba Set of buyer prosumers who trade with auction price.
Sa Set of seller prosumers who trade with auction price.
N Set of participating prosumers.
n Index of each prosumer.
t Index of time slot.
en,d(t) Energy demand of prosumer n at t.
en,g(t) Energy that n buys from CPS at t.
en,p(t) Energy that n buys from another peer at t.
En,b(t) Bidding energy by buying prosumer n at t.
En,s(t) Bidding energy by selling prosumer n at t.
ES(t) Total energy demand by all customers at t.
ED(t) Total energy demand by prosumers at t.
EO(t) Total energy demand by customers other than prosumers
at t.
ET (t) Threshold set by the CPS at t.
EG(t) Energy supply capacity of the CPS at t.
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pg,b(t) Buying price per unit of energy set by the CPS at t.
pg,s(t) Selling price per unit of energy set by the CPS at t.
pp2p(t) P2P trading price at t.
pn,b(t) Bidding price of n at t.
pauc Auction price.
pmax Highest reservation price.
pFiT Feed-in-tariff price.
pmid Mid-market price.
Un,s(t) Utility of n for selling energy at t.
Un,b(t) Utility of n for buying energy at t.
Jc(t) Cost to the CPS at t.
a, b Design parameters for the CPS.
αn(t) Preference parameter of n at t.
β Design parameter.
(·∗) Equilibrium value of the parameter (·).
Γ Stackelberg game.
Dhp Stability index of Γ.
ν Value of a coalition.
ηn Burden to prosumer n.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent advancements in cryptocurrencies and blockchain have led
to a proliferation of peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading schemes [1]–
[3]. Essentially, P2P trading is a next-generation energy management
mechanism for the smart grid that enables a customer of the network
to independently participate in energy trading with other prosumers
and the grid [4]. Potential benefits of P2P energy trading include
renewable energy usage maximization, electricity cost reduction, peak
load shaving, prosumer empowerment, and network operation and
investment cost minimization.
To realize some of the above-mentioned benefits, a number of
studies have been conducted in P2P trading in recent years. These
studies can be divided into three general categories. The first category
of studies, such as [5]–[12], focus on the financial modeling of P2P
energy trading market. In [5], the authors present the concept of
a blockchain-based microgrid energy market without the need for
central intermediaries. Blockchain-based energy trading to reduce the
cost of establishment in energy limited Industrial Internet of Things
nodes is also discussed in [6]. A multi-agent simulation framework
and a consensus-based approach for P2P energy trading in a microgrid
are used in [7] and [8] respectively. The role of battery flexibility on
P2P trading is discussed in [9] and their controls for P2P energy
sharing using a two-stage aggregated battery control are presented in
[10]. Finally, game theory based contracts between sellers and buyers
of the P2P market are developed in [11] and [12].
The second category of studies focuses on the challenges of
transferring energy over the physical layer [5] of the distribution
network. For example, [13] proposes a methodology to assess the
impact of P2P transactions on the network and to guarantee an
exchange of energy that does not violate network constraints. A real-
time attribution of power losses to each P2P transaction involving
one generator and one load node is done by defining some suitable
indices in [14]. A similar study of energy blockchain in microgrids
can be found in [15]. In [16], the authors propose a graph-based loss
2allocation framework for P2P market in unbalanced radial distribu-
tion networks. Finally, [17] shows how to achieve decentralization
using P2P frameworks as underlying control structures, and then,
implement a pure P2P to eliminate single points of failure.
The final category of studies deals with engaging prosumers in
P2P energy trading. Examples of such studies include [18], [19] and
[20]. A new concept of energy classes, allowing energy to be treated
as a heterogeneous product, based on attributes of its source which
are perceived by prosumers to have value is introduced in [18]. The
authors in [19] design a P2P energy trading platform to incentivize
prosumers to form federated power plants. Finally, a motivational
psychology based game theoretic approach is proposed in [20] to
attract prosumers to participate in P2P energy trading. More survey
of P2P energy trading schemes can also be found in [21] and [22].
As can be seen from the above discussion, studies related to
P2P energy trading are plentiful and have significantly contributed
to prosumer-focused energy management. However, as identified in
[5], integrating the P2P energy trading mechanism into the current
energy policy requires P2P trading to fit and complement the existing
energy system. Otherwise, P2P trading markets would be difficult to
implement in grid-connected systems. One potential way to establish
the suitability of a P2P energy trading scheme to implement in the
traditional energy system is to show how such a scheme can benefit
the centralized power system (CPS). For example, by effectively sup-
porting the outdated electrical grids at Brooklyn, Brooklyn microgrid
is actively working closely with utilities and is currently on its way
to being licensed as an energy retailer [5]. Nonetheless, such benefits
of P2P energy trading to the traditional power system are yet to be
established.
To this end, this paper proposes a comprehensive analytical
framework of a dynamic price based P2P energy trading scheme
that can help the CPS reducing its cost of energy production and
supply to the prosumers at the peak demand period. In particular,
we propose a cooperative Stackelberg game that comprises a CPS
as the leader and the prosumers as followers. At the peak hour,
the CPS strategically chooses the selling price per unit of energy
such that supply of energy to prosumers (consequently, the cost of
excess generation or reserve) reduces to zero. In response to the
choice of price made by the CPS, prosumers, as followers of the
game, use the double auction to participate in a coalition formation
game. The objective of the followers is to form suitable coalitions,
based on their submitted bids, and participate in P2P energy trading
with the neighboring peers of the same coalition with the purpose
of meeting the demand of energy without interacting with the CPS.
We analyze various properties of the resulting game. In particular,
it is shown that, due to the strategy proof property of the auction
and stability of the formed coalitions, the proposed game possesses
a unique cooperative Stackelberg equilibrium. We derive a closed-
form pricing function for the CPS and propose an algorithm that
the CPS and prosumers can use to reach the solution of the game.
Further, we show that the resultant solution is also prosumer-centric.
Using numerical simulation, we assess the properties of the proposed
scheme.
We stress that the Stackelberg game has been extensively used
in the literature such as in [23]–[25] and [26] for designing energy
trading schemes for the smart grid. However, in these studies,
the framework of a noncooperative Stackelberg game is used, in
which followers, in response to the leader’s strategy, participate in a
noncooperative game such as a Nash game, Generalized Nash game,
or best response strategies. In this paper, on the other hand, followers’
responses are captured via a coalition formation game considering
its capacity to dynamically consider the impact of environmental
changes on prosumer’s decision on cooperative interaction with one
another for P2P trading. Thus, the proposed game is a cooperative
Stackelberg game. Consequently, the studied properties, the design of
the algorithm, and the resulting solutions are substantially different
than the existing studies. We further note that price-based coordi-
nation of distributed energy resources to support the grid is also a
topic of interest in the literature related to virtual power plant (VPP).
However, the coordination strategies of DERs for VPP and P2P are
different from one another [19].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The problem is
formulated in Section II and an analytical framework of the cooper-
ative Stackelberg game is proposed in Section III. The properties of
the game is studied in Section IV. We provide some results from
numerical case studies in Section V, which is followed by some
concluding remarks in Section VI.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
To formulate the problem, we assume an energy network that
consists of a CPS and a large number of customers. Among the
customers, N are prosumers, where N = |N | and N is the set of
all prosumers. In this paper, customers refer to energy entities in the
network that buy energy from the CPS. Prosumers, on the other hand,
have energy producing capability, can participate in P2P trading, and
sell its energy to the CPS or any other third party. Both the CPS and
prosumers have two-way communication and power flow facilities
[27] and are parts of the P2P network through a blockchain based
platform [5].
Each prosumer n ∈ N is a rational individual, which is equipped
with a rooftop solar panel with or without a battery in a grid-
connected system. At any time t, a prosumer n meets its energy
demand en,d(t) from its own solar system and, if there is any surplus
after consumption and storage, it can sell the excess energy either to
the grid or to other energy entities within the system at the next time
slot. Similarly, if a prosumer determines an deficiency at the end of
t, it can buy its required energy either from the grid or from other
entities within the system at t+ 1.
The CPS, on the other hand, always needs to meet the total demand
ES(t) of its customers. If the total demand ES(t) of the customers
is very high, for example, during peak hours, the network could be
overloaded and the CPS might need to start a new generation unit or
always maintain reserve to meet the extra demand of its customers.
This increases the cost to the CPS significantly [28]. To this end, we
assume that the CPS has a contract with N prosumers, in which the
CPS may instruct the prosumers to not demand any energy from the
CPS at the peak hour when their total demand ED(t) is higher than
a threshold ET (t). Here, ET (t) is set to ensure that the total demand
ES(t) from the customer do not exceed the supply EG(t) from the
CPS. Now, ES(t) can be defined as
ES(t) = ED(t) + EO(t), (1)
where, EO(t) is the total demand of the customers excluding the
prosumers in set N . Now, when ED(t) > ET (t), where the value of
ET (t) : ES(t) ≤ EG(t) can be determined through suitable artificial
intelligence technique, such as in [29], based on the information of
EO(t), ED(t) and EG(t), the CPS sends a very high pricing signal
to the prosumers under contract to encourage them to manage their
own energy among themselves without getting any supply from the
CPS at t. The objective of the CPS is to make ED(t) = 0 through its
choice of price pg,s(t) per unit of energy for the selected prosumers
at the respective peak demand time slot. Thus, on the one hand, the
CPS meets the demand of its other customers without raising the cost
of production and supply of energy significantly. On the other hand,
this enables the prosumers to participate in P2P trading among one
another to meet their demands of that particular time period.
3Here, it is important to note that prosumers can participate in P2P
trading at any time, as studied in [12], [20]. However, in this paper,
the main objective is to show how P2P trading can be used as a tool
to help the CPS to reduce its cost of oversupply of energy during
periods of peak demand. Therefore, we assume that prosumers only
participate in P2P energy trading when the grid price is very high at
the peak hours. Otherwise, the prosumers exchange their energy with
the CPS as a rooftop solar owner in a traditional energy market. Now,
to capture the benefit and cost of energy trading to the prosumers
and CPS respectively, we define a suitable utility function for the
prosumer and a cost function of the CPS in the following subsections.
A. Utility Function of the Prosumer
We consider that the utility to a prosumer consists of two parts: 1)
the utility of energy usage (consumption and supply), which can be
captured by a logarithm function log(·) as proposed in [30]. 2) The
revenue and cost of trading with another party (the CPS or another
prosumer), which is a function of the traded energy amount and the
price per unit of energy. To this end, we propose to use the following
two functions (2) and (3)
Un,s(t) = αn(t) log2(1 + en,g(t) + en,p(t))
+pg,b(t)en,g(t) + pp2p(t)en,p(t) (2)
and
Un,b(t) = αn(t) log2(1 + en,g(t) + en,p(t))
−pg,s(t)en,g(t)− pp2p(t)en,p(t) (3)
to capture the utilities Un,s(t) and Un,b(t) that the prosumer n
obtains when it sells and buys energy respectively. Here, αn(t) is a
preference parameter of the prosumer n that captures the satisfaction
level of the prosumer for using a unit of energy at t, and en,g(t)
and en,p(t) are the energy amount that the prosumer n trades with
the CPS and other peers respectively. pg,s(t), pg,b(t) and pp2p(t) are
the grid’s selling price, grid’s buying price and the P2P trading price
respectively. Clearly, as the system is defined, when a prosumer is
participating in energy trading with the CPS, it does not perform P2P
trading with another prosumer, i.e., en,p(t) = 0,when en,g(t) > 0,
and vice versa.
Now, when en,g(t) > 0, the utility to a prosumer n for buying its
energy from the CPS under such conditions can be expressed as
Un,b(t) = αn(t) log2(1 + en,g(t))− pg,s(t)en,g(t). (4)
From (4), the utility attains its maximum value when
δUn,b(t)
δen,g(t)
= 0,
and hence
en,g(t) =
αn(t)
pg,s(t) ln 2
− 1. (5)
Indeed, from (5), the amount of energy that a prosumer buys from
the CPS is affected by the price set by the CPS. Hence, if the price
is very high, prosumers may decide to look for alternate venues for
their energy demand, which is the main avenues that is explored in
this study.
B. Cost Function of the CPS
We assume that there is a net cost Jc(t) to the CPS when it
trades its energy with the prosumers. Jc(t) has a cost component
and a revenue component. The revenue component pg,s(t)ED(t) is
the revenue that the CPS obtains by selling the total energy ED(t)
to the prosumers at a price pg,s(t) per unit of energy. Meanwhile,
the cost component refers to the equivalent cost that the CPS needs
to pay for meeting the demand of prosumers beyond its predefined
threshold, for example, for violating the network constraint or for
starting an additional generator to meet the excess demand. Given
this context, the cost function of the CPS is proposed to be
Jc(t) = a([ED(t)− ET (t)]
+)2 + b[ED(t)−ET (t)]
+
−pg,s(t)ED(t), (6)
where [·]+ = max(·, 0) and a, b > 0. In (6), we note that the cost to
CPS only occurs when the CPS needs to meet a total demand beyond
its defined threshold. To minimize the cost in such cases, the CPS
needs to choose a suitable price that would encourage prosumers to
purchase their required energy from other alternative venues, instead
of buying from the CPS. As such, the CPS sets a suitable price pg,b(t)
when ED(t) > ET (t) with the purpose of minimizing its cost. Thus,
by setting
δJc(t)
δED(t)
= 0, we obtain the price pg,s(t) as
pg,s(t) = 2a(ED(t)− ET (t)) + b. (7)
Now, based on the total demand ED(t) and the threshold ET (t), the
CPS can choose a suitable price by setting the values of a and b in
order to alter the demand of the prosumers for secured and sustainable
operation of energy trading.
Given this context, following [30], replacing the value en,g(t) from
(5) to (4) , and then taking the first derivative of Ub,n(t) with respect
to en,g(t), we find the maximum price pn,max that the prosumer n
needs to pay the CPS for purchasing its required energy at the peak
hour as
pn,max =
αn(t)
ln 2
. (8)
From (7) and (8), to influence a prosumer n not to buy any energy
at the peak hour, the CPS needs to set its price pg,s(t) such that
pg,s(t) >
α(t)
ln 2
, (9)
where α(t) = max(α1(t), α2(t). . . . , αN (t)). Therefore, for a
predefined value of a, to keep the total demand ED below ET , the
CPS sets its pricing parameters b in (7) such that
b >
α(t)− 2a ln 2(ED(t)− ET (t))
ln 2
. (10)
Now, once the price is set by the CPS, the prosumers require to
respond in a way such that they do not need to rely on the CPS’s
energy, and at the same time, are capable of meeting their energy
demand. To assist the CPS in reducing its peak demand through P2P,
application of such a model will potentially be found in the future
energy markets that will either engage prosumers with existing solar
panels (and batteries) with the CPS under an Energy Performance
Contract (EPC) [31] or receive investment from the local government
or the CPS to install solar panels (and batteries) at the prosumers’
premises to receive such services (for example, see [32]).
Now, to capture the decision making process of each prosumer,
when ED(t) > ET (t), we propose an energy management scheme
based on a cooperative Stackelberg game in the next section.
III. COOPERATIVE STACKELBERG GAME
To study the decision making process of the CPS and the partici-
pating prosumers in the proposed grid instructed P2P energy trading
scheme, we use the framework of a Stackelberg game Γ, which is
formally defined in its strategic form as
Γ = {(N ∪ CPS) , Un∈N (t), Jc(t), en,p(t), pg,s(t), pp2p(t)}. (11)
In (11), Γ consists of the following components:
i) The prosumers in set N that act as followers and cooperate with
one another to choose their strategies in response to the price
set by the CPS at the peak hour.
4ii) Un(t) ∈ {Un,s(t), Un,b(t)} is the utility of prosumer n for
trading its energy at t, either as a seller or a buyer, with other
prosumers and the CPS.
iii) Jc(t) is the cost to the CPS at t.
iv) en,p(t) and pp2p(t) are the strategies, that is traded energy and
the price per unit of traded energy in P2P market, of the followers
while participating in P2P trading.
v) pg,s(t) is the strategy of the CPS when ED(t) > ET (t).
In the proposed Γ, as discussed previously, the objective of the CPS
is to set a price that reduces its energy trading with the prosumers
to zero when ED(t) > ET (t). The aims of the prosumers with
energy deficiency, on the other hand, are to buy the necessary energy
from prosumers of the community with energy surplus via forming
suitable coalitions for P2P energy trading. A suitable solution of the
proposed Γ is the cooperative Stackelberg equilibrium (CSE). At the
CSE, neither the CPS nor any prosumer will have any incentive to
choose alternative strategies to improve their benefits in terms of
achieved cost and utility respectively.
Definition 1. Consider the game Γ defined in (11), where Un,s(t),
Un,b(t) and Jc(t) are determined by (2), (3) and (6) respectively.
Now, a set of strategies (p∗g,s(t), e
∗(t),p∗p2p(t)) constitutes a CSE
of the proposed Γ, if
Jc(p
∗
g,s)(t) = 0 (12)
and the followers’ strategies (e∗,p∗p2p) in response to p
∗
g,b(t) estab-
lish a Dhp stable coalition structure.
Definition 2. A group of coalitions is said to be in Dhp stable if, at
a given time slot, no player has an interest to split from one coalition
and form another new coalition for a better utility.
A. Leader’s Strategy
Based on our discussion in Section II-B and the utility of the CPS
considered in (9), clearly the CSE strategy of the CPS is
p
∗
g,s(t) = 2a
∗(ED(t)− ET (t)) + b
∗
. (13)
Thus, at the peak hour, to influence the prosumers to buy their
required energy through participating in P2P trading, the CPS sets
pg,s(t) = p
∗
g,s(t), according to (13). In (13), the value of a
∗ and
b∗ can be obtained either based on a tabular database, in which
the various pre-defined values of a∗ and b∗ are stored for different
scenarios based on the historical cases, or by forming and executing
an additional optimization technique that provides the values of a∗
and b∗ for the considered scenario at t. Nonetheless, in both cases,
the values of a∗ and b∗ will need to satisfy condition (10).
Now, according to Definition 1, to reach the CSE solution, the
followers need to find their strategies to form a coalition structure
in response to p∗g,s(t), which is Dhp stable. Given this context, we
formulate a coalition formation game among the prosumers in the
next section.
B. Followers’ Response
In response to the leader’s strategy, prosumers, as the followers of
Γ, participate in a coalition formation game to decide on their own
strategies. Coalition formation game is a branch of cooperative game,
in which the main purpose is to analyze the formation of the coalition
structure through players’ interaction, and study its properties and its
adaptability to the environmental variation [33]. It can be formally
defined as a pair (N , ν), where N is the set of all participating
players and ν is the value of coalition. Essentially, ν is a real number
assigned to every coalition of prosumers S ⊂ N for P2P trading.
In the proposed coalition formation game, a prosumer n can
independently choose other prosumers with whom it wants to form
coalition to trade energy. This decision is motivated by the individual
benefit Un that a prosumer n can obtain by cooperating with the
selected prosumers. Thus, in a coalition formation game, choosing
a particular coalition is based upon the individual benefit to the
prosumer, rather than the coalition value ν. Of course, a prosumer
may also choose not to participate in the P2P trading, rather buy
its energy from the CPS despite the price p∗g,s(t). Such behaviour
is referred to as the non-cooperative behavior of the prosumer in
this paper. Nonetheless, to determine how a prosumer chooses other
neighboring prosumers to form a coalition in order to participate
in P2P trading, we assume that prosumers adopt a double auction
scheme, as described in the following section.
1) Double auction between prosumers: A double auction market
involves a number of buyers and sellers that interact with one another
with their reservation prices and bids to decide 1) the price of P2P
trading and 2) how much energy each prosumer can trade with one
another. Thus, due to the interactive and independent nature of the
decision making process of each participant, a double auction is
chosen for the proposed P2P energy trading between the prosumers.
In general, the proposed auction scheme consists of three key
elements:
• Seller: The prosumers in S ⊂ N that have surplus energy to
sell.
• Buyer: The prosumers in B ⊂ N that need to buy energy to
meet their needs.
• Auctioneer: An auctioneer could either be a third party such as
the distribution system operator (DSO) that can participate in the
trading through a digital trading platform such as the Elecbay,
as proposed in [11], or an automated and secured information
system such as the blockchain [1], [34], which is able to
accurately decide the auction price and trading energy amount
following some well defined rules based on the information
provided by all prosumers.
We assume that the auction between prosumers are conducted fol-
lowing two steps. These steps are explained as follows.
Step 1- Determination of auction price and participating pro-
sumers: In this step of the proposed auction process, the auctioneer
determines the number of prosumers that intend to form a coalition
group to trade their energy based on the outcomes determined by
the auction process. To do so, first, at each time slot, each seller
n ∈ S submits its reservation price pn,s and energy En,s that it
is interested to sell to the auctioneer. Similarly, each buyer n ∈ B
submits its bidding price pn,b and energy En,b that it is interested
to buy from the auctioneer. Second, once all the ordered information
is received by the auctioneer, it arranges the reservation prices in
ascending order and the bidding prices in descending order [35].
That is, pn,s, ∀n ∈ S and pn,b, ∀n ∈ B are ordered without loss of
generality as
p1,s < p2,s < . . . < pS,s and p1,b > p2,b > . . . > pB,b (14)
respectively, where B = |B| and S = |S|.
Third, the auctioneer generates the aggregated supply and demand
curves using (14) to determine the intersection point of the two
curves, as shown in Fig. 1. Clearly, the price pmax at the intersection
point in Fig. 1 refers to the highest reservation price for the sellers.
Now, once pmax is determined, there are different mechanisms avail-
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Fig. 1: A demonstration of how the auction price is determined in the
proposed scheme.
able in the literature to decide the auction price1. For example, in the
Vickrey auction mechanism [37], the auction price (also known as
Vickrey price pvic) is considered to be the second highest reservation
price. In [27], the authors propose a Stackelberg game and show that
the auction price corresponds to the trading price at the Stackelberg
equilibrium. Nevertheless, without loss of generality, in this work,
the auction price pauc is assumed to be as same as pmax, that is,
pauc = pmax.
Once the auction price pauc is calculated, then determine the
number of buyers |Ba| = Ba ≤ B and sellers |Sa| = Sa ≤ S
that will participate in P2P trading based on the auction price. For
example, according to Fig. 1, clearly all the prosumers ∀n ∈ Ba∪Sa
that satisfy the condition {pauc : pn,s ≥ pn,b} will trade their energy
among themselves using P2P trading.
Step 2- Allocation of energy: Once pauc is determined, the amount
of energy en,s that each seller n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Sa} sells in the
auction market is influenced by the demand of each buyer m ∈
{1, 2, . . . , Ba}. In particular,
en,s =
{
En,s if
∑Sa
n=1 En,s ≤
∑Ba
n=1En,b
(En,s − ηn)
+
if
∑Sa
n=1 En,s >
∑Ba
n=1En,b
. (15)
Clearly, each seller prosumer can sell their reserved energy to the
buyers when the deficiency is at least equal to the surplus. If the
surplus is higher, however, each seller n experiences a burden of ηn
that they cannot sell to the buyers. There could be different ways
to determine the burden to each seller. Examples of such techniques
include proportionate distribution and equal distribution. In this study,
we propose to use the equal distribution scheme for deciding the
burden of each prosumer. This is due to the fact that equal distribution
has been proven to be more suitable to deliver a strategy proof auction
mechanism [38]. To this end, we define ηn as
ηn =
1
Sa
(
Sa∑
n=1
En,s −
Ba∑
n=1
En,b
)
. (16)
1Note that while such dynamic pricing is not being used for residential
electricity rates in most parts of the world at present, with the emergence of
P2P energy trading, it is being used in existing P2P literature [27] and pilot
trials [36].
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Fig. 2: This figure demonstrates how a prosumer may choose different
coalitions to participate in P2P trading at different time slots of the day.
2) Formation of different coalition: As the auction is designed,
clearly, prosumers, for which the condition {pauc : pn,s ≥ pn,b}
is not satisfied, will not trade their energy using the auction price.
Hence, we consider that the prosumers that cannot participate in P2P
trading based on pauc form another coalition among themselves to
trade their energy in a P2P fashion at the market clearing price. In
fact, mid-market rate is currently being used in a different P2P pilot
project2 [36]. In this work, we define the mid-market price selling
pmid as a function of pauc and feed-in-tariff (FiT) price pFiT, that is
pmid =
pauc + pFiT
2
, (17)
and the mid-market buying price as (1+β)pmid. Here, βpmid, β > 0
is the price that buyer needs to pay as a subscription fee for using the
network for P2P trading [30]. Here, it is important to note the mid-
market price always brings lower benefit to both sellers and buyers of
the respective coalition compared to trade with pauc. Further, unlike
the proposed auction process, prosumers cannot directly choose the
trading price under mid-market rate. Thus, it is reasonable to state
that prosumers will always be interested to rebid when instructed by
the CPS for P2P trading in the next available time slot .
3) Coalition formation algorithm: The formation of a coalition
between different prosumers for P2P trading, as shown in Fig. 2,
is influenced by a prosumer’s decision to socially interact with one
another for trading its energy in selected time slots (when pg,s =
p∗g,s), given the fact that it cannot trade its energy with the grid.
Therefore, in each time slot, when prosumers are instructed for P2P
trading, first, a prosumer decides on an energy amount that it wants
to trade in the auction market and put a reservation price for that.
Second, based on all the reservation prices and submitted energy
amounts, auction price pauc is determined by the auctioneer following
the process explained in Section III-B1 and subsequently the members
of the coalition Ba∪Sa that will trade energy with one another based
on pauc are confirmed. Finally, once Ba ∪ Sa is confirmed for the
selected time slot, the rest of the prosumers N \Ba ∪ Sa decides to
form a second coalition to trade their energy among themselves at the
mid-market pricing schemes. The detail of the algorithm is shown in
Algorithm 1. The assumption of an accurate forecast of total demand
ED(t) in Algorithm 1 is motivated by the unprecedented performance
improvement demonstrated by the recently proposed state estimation
algorithms [39].
Once the coalition structure is formed following Algorithm 1, the
2For example, in the Horizon P2P-SmartTest community microgrid.
6Algorithm 1: Algorithm to form a stable coalition structure for
P2P trading.
1: Set an and bn of each prosumer n.
2: for Each time t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T} do
3: The CPS accurately forecasts the total demand ET (t) from
prosumers.
4: if ET (t) < ED(t) then
5: Coalition formation algorithm terminates.
6: else
7: The CPS sets pg,s(t) = p
∗
g,s(t) according to (13).
8: Prosumers receive p∗g,s(t) from the CPS.
9: Coalition formation algorithm
10: Each seller prosumer n ∈ S submits its bid
{pn,s(t), En,s(t)} to the auctioneer.
11: Each buyer prosumer n ∈ B submits its bid {pn,b, En,b}
to the auctioneer.
12: The auctioneer determines pauc and consequently Ba and
Sa following Section III-B1.
13: The mid-market price pmid is calculated via (17).
14: The prosumers in Ba ∪ Sa form coalition 1 and the
prosumers in N \ (Ba ∪ Sa) form coalition 2 for P2P
trading with pauc and pmid respectively.
15: A stable coalition structure is formed at time slot t.
16: end if
17: end for
prosumers trade their energy with one another within each respective
coalition. Prosumers can adopt any standard available techniques,
such as the technique proposed in [40] or a pool based auction,
to choose partners for P2P trading within each coalition. For the
coalition with the auction price, the traded energy amount by each
prosumers is decided by (15). As for the coalition with mid-market
price, the P2P trading is completed following the process described
in [20].
Remark 1. Indeed, it is possible that, at any selected time slot of P2P
trading, the total deficiency is greater than the total surplus within
a coalition and vice versa. In that case, the prosumers with energy
deficiency can either reschedule their activities to another time slot
or trade the energy from a third party, such as a large neighborhood
storage, at a different third party price.
IV. PROPERTIES OF THE STACKELBERG GAME
A. Existence of A Stable CSE
To study the properties of the proposed game, we note that the
strategy chosen by the CPS in (13) delivers a unique outcome to the
CPS for any value of b that satisfies (10). Thus, to determine whether
the proposed Γ has a unique and stable CSE, it is sufficient to only
investigate whether the coalition structure decided by the prosumers
through the proposed auction process is Dhp stable.
Now, to determine the stability of the proposed coalition structure,
first, we define the strategy-proof property of an auction mechanism,
which ensures that no prosumer can deviate or cheat from its revealed
strategy during the auction process without affecting the strategy
of other prosumers. Finally, considering the strategy-proof property
of the proposed auction mechanism, we prove the stability of the
proposed coalition formation framework, which subsequently proves
the existence of the CSE.
Definition 3. An auction mechanism is said to be strategy-proof, if
the participants reveal their true strategies during the auction process
and do not cheat and deviate from their chosen strategies during the
trading.
Theorem 1. The proposed auction mechanism followed by the
prosumers to decide on their respective coalition and subsequent P2P
trading is strategy-proof.
Proof. Let us assume that the energy amount that each prosumer n
reveal to trade via auction is E∗n,s and E
∗
n,b for a seller and buyer
respectively. Now, according to (16), if the total available supply and
demand are
∑
n∈Sa
E
∗
n,s and
∑
n∈Ba
E
∗
n,b respectively, the burden shared
by each participating seller n ∈ Sa is
η
∗
n =
1
Sa
(
Sa∑
n=1
E
∗
n,s −
Ba∑
n=1
E
∗
n,b
)
. (18)
Now, let us assume that one prosumer i, which is a seller, cheats
during the energy trading and trades E
′
n,s instead of E
∗
n,s. Then, the
burden at the solution is
η
∗
n =
1
Sa

 ∑
n∈Sa,n6=i
E
∗
n,s + E
′
i∈Sa,s −
∑
n∈Ba
E
∗
n,b

 , (19)
which is impossible. This is due to the fact that, as the scheme is
proposed, the burden, which is shared equally by all seller prosumers
only possess the value η∗n only if all ∀n ∈ Sa stick to E
∗
n,s for
trading, as they revealed during the auction.
Similarly, by considering that one buyer j ∈ Ba chooses to buy
E
′
n,b instead of E
∗
n,b during the trading process, it can be shown that
the buyers also need to stick to their revealed strategies and cannot
cheat in the proposed auction. Hence, no prosumer would cheat and
deviate from their chosen strategies without affecting others, and
this subsequently proves the strategy-proof property of the proposed
auction scheme.
Theorem 2. At any given time slot, the network structure or
partitions resulting from the followers response to the decision made
by the CPS is Dhp stable.
Proof. To prove this theorem, first, we note that the prosumers that
participate in the P2P trading via auction price are decided by the
proposed auction mechanism as discussed in the previous section.
Since the auction process is strategy-proof, as proven in Theorem 1,
no participating prosumers in the auction would leave the coalition
and become a part of another new coalition or act noncooperatively
during that particular time slot.
Second, as the scheme is designed, prosumers that cannot partici-
pate in the auction form another new coalition among themselves for
P2P trading at the mid-market price set by (17). Here it is important to
note that, indeed prosumers may also decide to act noncooperatively
instead of forming another coalition or form multiple joint coalitions.
Nonetheless, it is shown in [20] that at a mid market pricing for
P2P trading, prosumers always benefit more by forming a single
coalition with one another instead of acting noncooperatively or
forming multiple disjoint coalitions. Therefore, it is reasonable to
consider that, as a rational entity, each prosumer in N \ (Sa ∪ Ba)
will always choose to form a coalition among themselves without
acting noncooperatively.
Thus, at any given each time slot of P2P energy trading, the
coalition formation game among prosumers always results in two
coalitions with set of players (Sa ∪ Ba) and N \ (Sa ∪ Ba), in
which no player has any incentive to leave its own coalition for a
greater benefit. This establishes the fact that the network structure or
partitions resulting from the followers response to the decision made
by the CPS is Dhp stable.
7Now, based on the above discussion, clearly, in response to the
unique decision made by the CPS in (13), the prosumers form a
stable group of partitions for P2P trading. Consequently, the following
corollary holds true.
Corollary 1. The proposed cooperative Stackelberg game Γ between
the CPS and the prosumers possesses a unique and stable CSE.
B. Prosumer-Centric Property
While the proposed Γ is proven to be effective for reducing the
cost to the CPS to zero at the peak hours through P2P trading, it
is also important that the scheme does not compromise the benefit
to the prosumers. Prosumer-centric can be defined as the properties
of a technology that can potentially motivate people to participate
in or accept the technology [20]. Motivational psychology is an
ideal way to demonstrate this property [41]. This is particularly
due to the fact that a prosumer might not always be motivated
through economic incentive only. Now, we provide a summary
of motivational psychology properties and then show whether the
proposed scheme possesses these characteristics. To this end, what
follows is a summary of properties that a prosumer-centric scheme
needs to satisfy:
• Transitivity: Transitivity refers to the property that establishes
the fact that only one decision of the prosumer would maximize
its utility or minimize its cost compared to other alternative
decisions. As a consequence, as a rational prosumer, it makes
the rational choice [42].
• Dominance: If an action chosen by a prosumer is better than
another option in one state and at least as good in all other
states, the dominant option is chosen by the prosumer [42].
• Rational-economic: If an action economically benefits a pro-
sumer, the prosumer is most likely to take that action. That
is, monetary incentive is the key motivator for practicing a
technology [43].
• Positive reinforcement: The property of positive reinforcement
assumes that an equivalent positive outcome of the choice made
by a prosumer would motivate the prosumer to choose the same
action in the future to fulfill his relevant objective [44].
• Elaboration likelihood: According to this property, a technique
needs to have the capability to communicate its benefit to
the prosumers following either a central path or a peripheral
path [45]. The central path is assumed to be suitable when
an individual cares about the issue and the peripheral path is
more appropriate when the issue may be subjected to convey
unfavorable thoughts due to the ambiguity of the message.
Now, based on the discussion in the previous section, the proposed
P2P energy trading scheme clearly possesses the prosumer-centric
property due to following reasons:
• Once a prosumer receives a signal from the CPS to participate
in P2P trading, it can either cooperate with other prosumers in
the network or it can continue trade its energy with the CPS at
a higher price. Now, as stated in Corollary 1, the cooperation
between prosumers results in a stable solution. Therefore, no
prosumer would have any incentive to choose an alternative
strategy other than P2P trading, other than cooperate with one
another. This satisfies the transitivity and dominance properties
of the scheme.
• Since the choice of a coalition and the trading prices produce a
unique and stable CSE, and due to the fact that the price to trade
energy with the grid is very high, clearly trading in P2P energy
network benefits the prosumers economically. Consequently, the
P2P trading satisfies the rational-economic property.
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Fig. 3: This figure demonstrates how the CPS sets selling prices per
unit of energy at different time slots based on the total demand from
prosumers and the pre-defined threshold, which influence prosumers to
participate in P2P trading.
• By demonstrating how the proposed P2P energy trading can
benefit both the grid by reducing its peak demand and the pro-
sumers by reducing their cost of energy purchase from the grid
in each time slot of P2P trading, the proposed scheme establishes
a peripheral path to communicate with the prosumers. Further,
by exhibiting the same beneficial outcome for both the grid and
prosumers in every time slot of P2P trading, the proposed energy
trading scheme also validates its positive reinforcement property.
Thus, based on the above discussion, it is reasonable to state the
following Corollary.
Corollary 2. The proposed P2P energy trading scheme is a
prosumer-centric technique.
V. CASE STUDIES
In this section, we show some results from numerical case studies
to demonstrate how the proposed P2P energy trading scheme benefits
both the CPS and prosumers at the peak hour. For numerical case
studies, we consider a residential network with 12 prosumers. Each
prosumer is assumed to have a solar panel of 5 kWp. The energy
surplus and deficiency of each prosumer is randomly chosen from
the range [2,9]. However, these values could be different for different
generation and consumption patterns of prosumers at different loca-
tions. To trade the energy at each time slot3, the prosumers choose
their bidding from the range [11,15], which is chosen such that the
minimum bidding price is higher than the FiT price 10 cents per kWh
and the highest bidding price is lower than the grid’s selling price
28 cents per kWh at the off-peak hour. The residential solar data
is provided by Redback Technologies, Australia, which is a startup
company based in Brisbane that provides smart inverter solutions to
households.
A. Benefit to the CPS
In order to show how the proposed approach benefits the CPS,
we first show the strategy adopted by the CPS at different demand
scenarios from its contracted prosumers. In particular, in Fig. 3, the
selling price per unit of energy chosen by the CPS is demonstrated
at different selected time slots during a day. In this figure, we
3Each time slot is assumed to have a duration of 30 minutes [11].
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Fig. 4: The strategy of the CPS reducing its total cost when the total
demand of prosumers is higher than the threshold. The negative cost
refers to the revenue of the CPS from selling its energy for the case
when prosumers’ total demand is lower than the threshold.
deliberately show only seven time slots for clarity of illustration of
how the CPS sets its price based on the demand and threshold at any
given time slot. According to Fig. 3, when the total demand of the
prosumers is below its threshold of that selected time slot, the grid
sells its energy to the prosumers at the general standard off peak rate
of 28 cents per kWh. However, as soon as the total demand becomes
greater than the threshold, the CPS changes its trading price for the
contracted prosumers to a higher value via (13). For example, at time
slot 3 and 4 the price per unit of energy is set to 19.6 times higher
than the usual price, whereas at time slot 6, it is 12.5 times. In other
instances, when the total demands from the prosumers is within the
limits, the CPS sells the energy at the usual rate of 28 cents per kWh.
According to the proposed scheme, such a choice of price by the
CPS influences the prosumers to participate in P2P trading, instead
of trading energy with the CPS. In Fig. 4, we show the cost to the
CPS at different selected time slots of a day (from 7 am to 5 pm).
Based on this figure,
• At times, when the total demand is lower than the threshold,
the CPS is able to make revenue by selling the electricity to the
prosumers. For example, at time slots 1, 2, 5, 7–12, 14, 16–18,
and 20–22 the revenue to CPS is more than 500 cents.
• At times, when the total demand is higher than the threshold,
due to maintaining reserve and/or running new generation units,
the cost to the CPS increases significantly. For instance, at time
slot 6, the cost to the CPS increases to around 600 cents for
meeting the demand of the prosumers. Similar rises are also
observed at time slots 4, 13, 15, and 19.
• However, for the proposed scheme, the price set by the CPS
instructs the prosumers to participate in P2P trading instead of
buying the energy from the CPS. This subsequently reduces
the cost to the CPS to zero as no excess energy needs to be
generated.
B. Benefit to the prosumers
According to the proposed scheme, prosumers participate in P2P
energy trading only when they are influenced by the CPS with a very
large electricity price signal. Otherwise, they trade their energy with
the grid in usual manner. Now, to show how participating in P2P
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Fig. 5: Formation of coalitions by different prosumers for P2P energy
trading.
energy scheme can help the prosumers, we show the results for a
particular time slot. For example, let us consider time slot 3 of Fig. 3
and Fig. 4. Clearly, due to the high price of the CPS, prosumers need
to participate in P2P trading to balance their demand and surplus.
Now, without a loss of generality and as shown in Fig. 5, we consider
that prosumers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 have surplus, whereas prosumers
7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 need more energy to fulfil their demand.
To participate in P2P trading, the prosumers adopt Algorithm 1 and
based on the auction price, prosumers form two coalitions. According
to Fig. 5, prosumers 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 form coalition 1 to trade
their energy at the auction price. The rest of the prosumers, that is
prosumers 1, 2, 10, 11 and 12, form a second coalition to trade their
energy at the mid-market rate, following the process explained in
[20].
TABLE I: Demonstration of seller prosumers’ increase in their revenues
for participating in P2P energy trading.
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Once the coalition is formed and the trading of energy is taken
place at respective coalitions, the sellers and buyers of energy have
their own revenue and costs. Now, we show how each prosumer
benefits compared to the case of trading energy with the CPS or
a third party (such as neighborhood storage) at the selected time
slot. In Table I, we show the revenue that the seller prosumers in
different coalitions obtain for participating in P2P trading. Based
on Table I, following properties of the scheme can be summarized:
1) auction based P2P demonstrates greater revenue to the prosumer
compared to the revenues to the sellers trade their energy at the mid-
market rate. This property always encourages prosumers to rebid in
the next available time slot of P2P trading in order to get a better
benefit; 2) it is always beneficial for the sellers to sell their energy
to other prosumers within the P2P network compared to sell them to
the CPS; 3) for the considered system and selected time slot, each
9prosumer achieves a revenue, which is 22% greater, on average, than
the revenue that it could have obtained by selling its surplus to the
CPS.
TABLE II: Demonstration of buyer prosumers’ savings in their costs for
participating in P2P energy trading.
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In Table II, we show the cost to each buyer within each coalitions
for participating in P2P trading. Clearly, P2P trading is the better
option for prosumers to meet their demand. Otherwise, the very high
price of the CPS4 (Fig. 3) increases the cost to each buyer in both
coalitions significantly. For example, if a prosumer decides to buy its
required energy from the CPS despite the high price signal, its cost
of buying the energy increases by about 97% compared to buying the
energy from the P2P energy trading market. Of course, as a rational
entity, a prosumer may also decide to buy its energy from other
alternative sources such as third party neighborhood storage [47], for
example by participating in a non-cooperative game. In such a non-
cooperative scenario, each prosumer acts as a rational player who can
independently decide on its strategy of whether it wants to buy its
energy from the CPS or from the third party in response to the price
signal sent by the CPS. Thus, the game framework can be referred to
as a non-cooperative Stackelberg game, in which the CPS acts as the
leader, which decides on its own strategy of selling price per unit of
energy. Prosumers, on the other hand, act as followers, who decide
on the venue from which it can buy its energy in response to the
price set by the CPS. The solution of the game is a non-cooperative
Stackelberg equibrium, at which, due to the very high price of the
CPS, all prosumers start trading with the third party. Thus, both the
CPS and prosumers reach an equilibrium state from where neither
the CPS nor any prosumer want to deviate at the selected time slot.
However, the cost to the prosumers is still very high compared
to the price in the P2P trading market. In particular, as can be seen
from Table II, participating non-cooperatively increases the cost to
the prosumer by on average 50% compared to the P2P energy trading
market. Thus, when the CPS sends the high price signal to the
prosumers, participating in the proposed P2P energy trading scheme
is the best option for both sellers and buyers, instead of acting non-
cooperatively, considering their respective revenues and cost.
TABLE III: This table shows how the change in total number of
prosumers impacts the total cost to the CPS and prosumers in P2P trading.
!"#$%&'
()'
*&(+"#%&+'
,(-./'
0%#.10'
2(+-'-('234'567'
,(-./'2(+-'-('
*.&-898*.-81:'*&(+"#%&+'
567'
2(+-'&%0"9-8(1')(&'
*.&-898*.-81:'81'3;3'567'
!"#$%&'&% !"#$()#%&'&% !"#$%&'&% !"#$()#%&'&% 234' 3%&'3&(+"#%&'
*+% ',% +% -.'/% ,.01% *+/.++% -.'/% *+.-'%
*2% ,1% +% 2-.*'% 3.-,% 2'3.++% 2-.*'% -,.1,%
'+% 1-% +% '-,.-1% *'.+2% *,/+.2+% '-,.-1% 0-.,'%
'2% 10% +% '2/.'2% *'./0% *2+0.2+% '2/.'2% 23.0/%
-+% 3'% +% /00.',% *1.0/% -3*+.++% /00.',% *'3.00%
<=%&.:%'9(+-'&%0"9-8(1' ;>?@;?' AB@?>'
'
Finally, in Table III, we show how an increase in the total number
of prosumers impacts the total cost to the CPS and average cost
4Example of such a high increase in selling price can also be found in
electricity spot markets in high renewable penetrated regions such as South
Australia [46].
per participating prosumers. Based on the results demonstrated in
Table III,
• The cost to the CPS is always 0 when prosumers participate in
P2P in response to the CPS’s price signal, which is consistent
with the proposed scheme. However, if there is no participation
in P2P, the cost to the CPS increases substantially as the number
of prosumers increases, which is mainly due to the increase in
total demand to the CPS.
• The cost per prosumer5 increases as the number of prosumers
increases. However, due to the higher selling price per unit of
energy, the cost per prosumer is much higher for not participat-
ing in P2P compared to the case when prosumers participate in
P2P. On average, for all the considered prosumers number, the
cost per prosumer shows a $61.58 reduction for participating in
P2P for the considered parameter values in this case study. As
for the CPS, the cost savings for the proposed case is $285.25,
on average, when prosumers follow the scheme proposed in this
study.
Thus, engaging in P2P energy trading by the prosumers following the
proposed framework brings benefit to both the CPS and prosumers.
Hence, the proposed scheme has the potential to attract the CPS
and prosumers to participate in scenarios that are aligned with the
assumptions outlined in the paper.
Finally, we note that the computational complexity of the proposed
algorithm falls within a category of that of a single leader multiple
follower Stackelberg game, which has been shown to be reasonable in
numerous studies such as in [24] and [25]. As such, the computational
complexity is feasible for adopting the proposed scheme.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the analytical framework of a
peer-to-peer energy trading scheme that can help the energy grid
to get rid of excess demand from the prosumers at the peak hour,
while, at the same time, confirmed a prosumer-centric solution. To
this end, we have proposed a cooperative Stackelberg game by
assuming the centralized power system as the leader and prosumers as
followers. A closed form expression has been presented to capture the
decision making process of the leader, whereas we have formulated
a double-auction based coalition formation game to facilitate pro-
sumers’ decisions of the energy trading parameters. The properties
of the proposed cooperative Stackelberg game have been studied
and it has been shown that the game possesses a unique and stable
Stackelberg equilibrium. Further, we have proposed an algorithm that
enables the prosumers and the centralized power station to reach the
equilibrium of the game. Finally, we have presented some numerical
case studies to show how the proposed scheme can ensure benefits
to all participating energy entities in the P2P trading.
A potential extension of the proposed work is the investigation of
the impact of uncertainty of prosumers’ demand as well as their non-
cooperative behavior on the CPS’s decision making process. Further,
how prosumers can exploit the proposed framework to assist the
CPS, and simultaneously participate in P2P energy trading among
themselves within the grid-tied setting is another direction that is of
interest for further investigation.
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